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Abstract 
Recent events leading to the importation of democratic ideas and ideals by previously 
totalitarian states increase our interest in the ways in which electoral institutions influence 
party systems . However, even if we restrict our attention to Eastern Europe or the 
successor states of the Soviet empire, we encounter a range of social diversity - ethnic 
heterogeneity - that is as great as those in the set of countries examined in earlier studies 
that seek to identify the influence of electoral laws ( c.f., Rae, Lijphart, and Taagepera and
Shugart). Curiously, though, these earlier studies fail to ascertain whether and to what
extent electoral laws mediate the influence of this heterogeneity. Hence, to develop a more 
pragmatic understanding of electoral institutions, we adopt the view of electoral laws as 
intervening structures and, using the data of these earlier analyses, we reconsider the role 
of one institutional parameter - district magnitude - that some researchers regard as the 
most important characteristic of an electoral system. Aside from the usual caveats about 
the limitations of our data, our primary conclusion is that district magnitude is not merely 
an important determinant of the number of parties that compete in a political system, 
but that it can offset the tendency of parties to multiply in heterogeneous societies. 
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Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties 
Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga V. Shvetsova 
The analysis of political institutions presumes that those institutions mediate between individual 
preferences and political outcomes, including the nature and number of political parties, public 
policy, and the stability of the institutions themselves. We also know that preferences have, as one 
source, society's underlying social structure, especially its ethnic structure. Thus, in ascertaining the 
influence of institutions on outcomes, we should consider the possibility that similar institutions in 
different social contexts yield different outcomes. Restated specifically for electoral politics, "[t]he 
relationship between electoral rules and party systems is not mechanical and automatic: A particular 
electoral regime does not necessarily produce a particular party system; it merely exerts pressure in 
the direction of this system ... " (Duverger 1959:40). 
This argument, though, is not always made part of our research. Lijphart's (1990) reassessment 
of Rae's (1971) seminal analysis of electoral laws is a case in point. Lijphart's essential modification 
is to take periods within a country without "major" changes in electoral structure as the unit of 
analysis rather than using each election as that unit. However, despite acknowledging that "there are 
other important causes of multipartism, particularly the number and depth of cleavages in a society" 
(1990: 488), Lijphart's reanalysis, like Rae, fails to consider Duverger's argument in its full form. The 
particular problem is that the "usual suspects" examined in these studies, stable democracies, vary 
greatly in character (compare an ethnically heterogeneous United States with a population of 250 
million to homogeneous states such as Iceland and Luxembourg whose combined population fails to 
exceed that of metropolitan Tulsa). Analyzing the effects of electoral institutions separate from other 
things ignores the possibility that institutions are intervening structures and that they influence, say, 
the number of political parties only to the extent that the "more basic" characteristics of a society act 
through them to increase or decrease this number. 
Our interest in understanding the influence of electoral laws derives from those recent events that 
have led to the importation of democratic ideas and ideals by previously totalitarian states. Even if 
we restrict our attention to Eastern Europe or the successor states of the Soviet empire, we encounter 
a range of social diversity that is as great as those in the set of countries examined by Lijphart and 
Rae. Hence, to develop a more pragmatic understanding of electoral institutions, we adopt the view 
of electoral laws as intervening structures and we reconsider Rae and Lijphart's analysis of the 
institutional parameter -- district magnitude -- that some researchers (c.f., Taagepera and Shugart 
1989) regard as the most important characteristic of an electoral system. In Section l we reconsider 
the data and some of the variables that are the focus of earlier studies, and in Section 2 we discuss 
an especially important component of social structure -- ethnic heterogeneity -- that sets the context 
for the operation of electoral institutions in general and district magnitude in particular. In Section 
3 we reanalyze matters using Lijphart's approach, whereas in Section 4 we consider Rae's election-by­
election method. In Section 5 we use both Rae and Lijphart's approaches to assess the extent to which 
our conclusions about the joint influence of district magnitude and ethnic heterogeneity depend on 
the inclusion in the data set of single-member district systems, and in Section 6 we offer some 
concluding remarks. 
I. Data and Variables
The Unit of Analysis: Lijphart criticizes Rae's election-by-election approach with the argument 
that a political system such as the United States, operating under a uniform electoral arrangement 
throughout this century, ought to be treated as a single observation. Entering all data from the United 
States along with data from the three French elections held under d'Hondt in 1945 and 1946 biases 
the analysis in the direction of the consequences of electoral laws as they appear in the U.S. So, after 
defining an electoral regime to be a period of time in a country in which electoral rules -- the seat 
allocation formula and the average number of seats to be filled in an electoral district (district 
magnitude) -- are essentially constant, Lijphart takes regimes as the unit of analysis. The values of 
other variables, such as the number of parties, are then set equal to their average across all elections 
within the regime. 
Lijphart's argument has at least one theoretically compelling justification that is consistent with 
his argument for this modification ("elections under the same rules are not really independent cases 
but merely repeated operations of the same electoral system" p. 482). Specifically, the usual 
hypotheses about the relationships between the number of parties and electoral laws concern the 
properties of systems in equilibrium.1 Indeed, it is here that we find the justification for excluding
data from "unstable" democracies. Hence, an empirical assessment of those hypotheses ought to focus 
on dependent variables such as "the equilibrium number of parties within a system," and averaging 
across all elections in a regime moves us closer to this ideal. 
This approach, however, can be criticized even if we restrict our attention to stable Western 
democracies. First, it introduces a bias that is opposite Rae's, because the data includes regimes that 
entail but a single election. Thus, Lijphart equates the weight of the first post-war (and presumably 
out-of-equilibrium) French and German elections to all the post-war elections held in, for instance, 
Canada, the United States, or Australia. Second, although we may predict that a change in electoral 
law will change the number or strengths of parties, it is not the case that we predict that these changes 
are instantaneous. Hence, the results of an election immediately following a change may tell us little 
about the consequences of that change. Third, averaging values of variables within a regime and 
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taking these averages as the observations introduces a number of econometric problems, including 
artificially increasing R2 and !-statistics. 
There is no wholly satisfactory methodology since there is no way to learn the "true" equilibrium 
number of parties in a regime that encompasses, say, two or three elections. Minimally, though, we 
can do two things. First, we can discard all one-election regimes (Sweden in 1948, Germany in 1949 
and 1953, and Israel in 1949). Second, we can set all variables equal to their values in the last election 
of each regime. But because this approach can be criticized as well (in addition to "wasting" the data 
from all but the last election of a regime, if changes in electoral laws are endogenous, this last election 
might actually be an out-of-equilibrium event that signals change), we also consider Rae's original 
approach and Lijphart's. In this way we assess the extent to which our conclusions depend on our 
handling of the data. 
These adjustments in the treatment of the data bear upon another issue -- the endogeneity of 
electoral laws. First, we should not be surprised to learn that specific institutional arrangements are 
chosen because they make life more secure for existing parties and political elites. For example, if 
single-member districting reduces the incentives of parties to fracture in a multi-ethnic environment, 
then a system that begins somehow with a small number of parties will maintain and even strengthen 
that system in the face of increasing heterogeneity to the extent that political elites have control over 
the rules of a game in which they are successful players. Similarly, if a multiparty system experiences 
some exogenous shock that threatens to disrupt party structures, then whether that shock changes 
party structures or whether, through the actions of elites, it results in the change of electoral laws in 
a way that maintains the status quo will depend on things that we cannot specify here (c.f., Shamir 
1985). 
Ideally, we prefer to test a theory that specifies [D'(H),N'(H)], where D'(H) is the equilibrium
district magnitude (or any other parameter of an electoral system under investigation) implied by the 
equilibrium number of parties, N'(H), where N'(H) is a number impled by D'(H), and where H
summarizes the permanent characteristics of a society (e.g., ethnic heterogeneity) that influences the 
relationship between D' and N'. Unfortunately, aside from those models that establish [ 1,2) and [2,2]
as equilibria under plurality rule (c.f., Palfrey 1989, Fedderson et al 1990, Cox 1984), we can offer 
only "reasonable arguments" that N' increases as D' increases and that [D' > 2, N' > 2) characterizes
whatever other equilibria are possible.2 Our analysis, like Rae's and Lijphart's, implicitly assumes 
that observed values of D correspond to equilibrium values and that changes in D are due to 
exogenous factors. But our adjustments in the counting of parties within a regime discussed in the 
next subsection seek a closer approximation to N' than Lijphart or Rae achieve.
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Counting Parties: Although he considers several alternatives, Rae's primary dependent variable 
is party fractionalization, F, based on the Herfindal-Hirschman index and applied to national election 
returns for the lower house of parliament or legislature. Lijphart and Taagepera and Shugart (I 989) 
calculate the "effective number of parties" by computing 1/(1-F). 
The use of this and similar indices stems from the belief that the analyst should not give equal 
weight to parties that receive, say, sixty versus five percent of the vote. The problem with any 
fractionalization index, though, is that it obscures the motives and actions of voters and political elites 
so that it becomes difficult or impossible to discern the effect of institutional structure on these 
separate motives. For example, suppose that whatever theory we possess predicts (for a given 
institutional structure and distribution of preferences over policies) that four parties will compete and 
that each will receive, in equilibrium, an approximately equal vote share. Fractionalization indexes 
would then measure the extent to which some parties are less than "full fledged" owing to differences 
in, say, organizational talent. On the other hand, suppose, for some other set of issue preferences, 
we predict that these four parties continue to compete but that they secure unequal vote shares in 
equilibrium. A fractionalization index, applied in combination with the observed actual number of 
parties, may then provide the appropriate measure of the extent to which voter choice matches 
theoretical expectations. In this instance, if our theory focuses on the incentives of political elites to 
form and to maintain parties or if it seeks to uncover the interaction of voter and elite motives, then 
such an index, if used alone, confuses matters by reporting a number less than four or even three. 
This problem is like counting the number of breakfast cereals on the market. One approach is to 
proceed to the local super-market and count; another approach is to compute a fractionalization index 
using market share data. Which number is correct? If we are interested in learning something about 
consumer tastes, then a measure of fractionalization may be of some value. But if we seek to gauge 
the extent to which the cereal market responds to variations in consumer taste or if we wish to 
compare the responsiveness of this market to others, then simple counts are more appropriate, along 
with independent measures of tastes. Similarly, unless we assume that all parties gain equal vote 
shares in equilibrium, application of a fractionalization index can mislead us about the incentives to 
organize parties. And since the only deductive, mathematically rigorous theory that makes such a 
prediction concerns special cases -- 1- and 2-member district systems under plurality rule (Palfrey 
1984, 1989, Fedderson et al 1990, Cox 1984) -- we should be suspicious of an index that seeks to 
combine or otherwise distill a complex set of interdependent choices. 
In addition, then, to employing "effective number of parties" as a dependent variable, we will also 
simply count the number of formally organized parties that secure more than one percent of the 
national vote or one or more seats in the lower house of the legislature.3 A one-percent cutoff is
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arbitrary, but it does take us part way toward eliminating "parties" that are mere ephemeral protest 
movements. In addition, we count only those parties who satisfy this cut-off in two or more 
successive elections, which has the effect of eliminating those candidates or parties who may receive 
a significant proportion of the vote in one election but who do not sustain themselves as a separately 
organized party. 
Time Period: Although Rae and Lijphart restrict their attention to post-World War II elections, 
we should not suppose that the "laws" of electoral competition came into play only after 1945. 
Elections before World War I may have differed from what followed owing to changes in the 
franchise; but only because World War II lay in the future is 1918-1939 distinct from the post-World 
War II period. We see no reason to suppose that the 1935 elections in Britain, for example, are a less 
valid observation than, say, the German elections of 1949. Consequently, we add the Continental 
elections in the interval 1918-39 to our data, along with all elections beginning with 1918 that 
occurred in those countries that held elections throughout the war.4 However, when analyzing
matters using Lijphart's approach, we assume that 1939-40 (or the pre-war election closest to this 
date) marked the end of a regime for all countries regardless of the electoral formula that each 
employed after the war. Finally, we also add post-War election data from Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
and Japan. 
District Magnitude: It is by now agreed in the comparative elections literature that THE critical 
institutional variable influencing the formation and maintenance of parties is district magnitude -­
the number of legislative seats to be filled within an electoral district. The importance of magnitude 
derives, in part, from its influence on the vote quota a party must secure to ensure representation in 
parliament. Also, magnitude influences a system's proportionality, which also influences the 
incentives to form and maintain parties: "[district magnitude] affects the proportionality of PR more 
than do the various mathematical translation formulas ... [and in] this regard the rule of thumb is that 
the smaller the district the lesser the proportionality and, conversely, the larger the district the greater 
the proportionality" (Sartori 1986: p. 53). 
Unfortunately, characterizing each country by a single measure of magnitude is the source of 
considerable difficulty. First, few countries with PR have multiple districts that are of uniform 
magnitude. Second, several such countries also have at-large districts or adjustment seats that are 
designed specifically to distort or "correct for" the influence of district magnitudes and seat allocation 
formulas. The most extreme case is Germany, with 249 single-member districts and a single 249-
member national "district." Owing to this variability, no single measure can capture all aspects of 
magnitude that appear relevant. Lijphart opts for a simple calculation based on average magnitude. 
But an average equates a country with N double-member districts to one that has N/2 single-member 
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districts plus a single N/2-member "adjustment" or at-large district (e.g., Germany). These two 
situations do not yield equivalent incentives for party formation, because each can yield a different 
vote share threshold that parties must meet before they secure legislative representation and because 
each generates different incentives for voters to vote strategically. 
In response to this and similar problems, Lijphart, who uses a simple categorical analysis, 
accommodates adjustment or at-large seats by moving a country with a "significant" number of such 
seats into the next larger category of average magnitude. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) offer perhaps 
the most extensive analysis of "effective" district magnitude and provide a formalized adjustment that 
seeks to accommodate the fact that legal thresholds or adjustment seats can override the strategic 
imperatives of a simple average. A wholly theoretically satisfactory justification of their approach, 
though, requires that: (I) all parties are national; (2) overall variations in district magnitude within 
a country are not great; and (3) the number of parties, N, is approximately equal to district magnitude 
plus one, D+I. Assumptions (I) and (2) are also required to justify using average magnitude. 
Assumption (3), though, reveals that "effective magnitude" is itself an endogenously determined 
parameter that is function, in part, of a variable we are attempting to predict. (Moreover, this 
assumption is not supported by the data.) 
The essential problem, here, of course, is that the incentives to form and maintain parties are a 
complex function of national and district electoral laws, as well as of parliamentary structure. Hence, 
we know that except for the simplest systems, no single index or measure can summarize the 
imperatives of most existing electoral laws. Absent a theory that tells us how to convert a description 
of an electoral system so that we can enter that description into a statistical analysis, we will focus on 
Rae-Lijphart's calculation of magnitude based on averages. However, in appreciation of the issues 
they raise, we also examine Taagepera and Shugart's adjustment.5 Comparing the performance of
these two measures tells us that additional refinements of the calculation of magnitude are likely to 
be profitable. 
2. Ethnic Heterogeneity
The study of political institutions assumes that outcomes follow from strategic choices taken as 
responses to individual preferences and institutional constraints. We have discussed constraints (e.g., 
district magnitude) and outcomes (e.g., number of political parties). Turning now to preferences, we 
begin by noting that Taagepera and Shugart (1989), in summarizing Duverger's argument, offer an 
analysis and a conclusion similar ours, namely that "( ! )  Plurality rule tends to reduce the number of 
parties .. ., regardless of the number of issue dimensions ... (2) PR Rules tend not to reduce the number 
of parties, if the number of issue dimensions favors the existence of many parties" (p. 65). However, 
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the issue dimensions Taagepera and Shugart count, taken from an earlier study by Lijphart (1984), 
are specifically substantive and thus can be said to be endogenous to the political system. Since 
different electoral systems give political elites different incentives to entrepreneur issue salience, we 
cannot reject the supposition that Taagepera and Shugart's findings are due to the influence of 
electoral system on issues rather than the effect of issues on outcomes as mediated by electoral system. 
What we require, then, is a measure of the exogenous determinants of those preferences that are 
relevant, a priori, to pressures to increase or decrease the number of political parties. In this respect, 
a key variable that is of evident contemporary concern is a society's ethnic heterogeneity. We need 
not review the innumerable essays that documenMhe influence.of ethnicity on politics. But, keeping 
in mind those instances in which political engineering must contend with ethnicity and ethnic conflict 
when attempting to implement stable democratic systems (c.f., Horowitz 1991), focusing on this 
characteristic of a society should help us ascertain how alternative electoral laws mediate the influence 
of ethnic heterogeneity. 
There are, though, a number of issues that arise when incorporating ethnic heterogeneity into our 
analysis: its measurement and the structural form of its incorporation. First, with respect to 
measurement, we begin by reconsidering our discussion of fractionalization indices. Earlier, we argue 
against the application of such indices to election returns data, because it confuses the interdependent 
motives and actions of voters and political elites. But social heterogeneity (with the possible exception 
of religion) is not a product of individual choice -- rather, it is better portrayed as an exogenously 
determined social state. And an especially convenient characterization of heterogeneity is the 
probability that two randomly chosen individuals are of the same ethnic group. Hence, if there are 
valid arguments that such indices measure anything, then they apply to ethnicity.6 Thus, one
indicator of ethnic heterogeneity is simply ethnic fractionalization, F, where F varies between O and 
I and denotes the ethnic (linguistic, religious) fractionalization of society (where 1, the upper limit 
of fractionalization, is approached when every individual is a member of a different group). 
Notice now that F admits two measures that can be entered into a regression analysis -- F itself, 
and H = 1/(1-F). This second variable, H, measures the "effective number of ethnic groups" in the 
same way as Lijphart calculates "effective number of parties" from Rae's fractionalization measure. 
However, in lieu of arguing whether F or H is more theoretically satisfying (we believe that H is the 
more appropriate calculation for the reasons that Lijphart and Taagepera and Shugart offer), we note 
simply that in the regressions reported in this essay, H uniformly provides better fits than does F. 
Of course, as with most other things, no single index can serve as a wholly satisfactory measure 
of every aspect of social heterogeneity that we might think is relevant. For example, separate indexes 
for ethnic, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity might be employed in recognition of the fact that 
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ethnic heterogeneity is but one potential dimension of social cleavage. Although we focus on 
ethnicity, because we have more confidence in its measurement and the resulting index of 
fractionalization,7 our problems do not end even if we employ separate indexes (see note 12 for
consideration of religious and linguistic heterogeneity). 
First, separate indexes would not tell us whether and to what extent these cleavages correlate. A 
society may have two ethnic and two religious groups, but anywhere from two to four distinct ethnic­
religious clusters depending on the extent to which these cleavages are cross-cutting. Second, a 
fractionalization index cannot tell us much about the salience of these cleavages, which is not only 
endogenous, but, as events in Belgium reveal, can change and can greatly influence party structures 
(Lijphart 1977, Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Finally, a fractionalization index ignores the important 
matter of territoriality. The particular problem is that ethnic, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity 
can operate differently when groups are geographically separate than when all groups are mixed (c.f., 
Horowitz 1985, 1991). Territoriality allows for a heterogeneous society but homogeneous election 
districts and thereby places can influence the incentives of parties to compete within a district and 
nationally. Thus, although Switzerland and the U.S. are both ethnically heterogeneous, the relative 
absence of territorial considerations in the U.S. as compared to the situation in Switzerland suggests 
that even if both countries adopted identical electoral laws, heterogeneity and those laws would 
operate differently in each country.8
At this point, though, we must confront the fact that even if we were to identify theoretically 
appropriate measures of all potentially relevant variables and their functional relationships, we would 
soon exhaust our degrees of freedom. There are many more potential permutations of social and 
institutional structures than would exist in any data set. However, our purpose here is not to ascertain 
precisely how ethnic heterogeneity influences party systems. Rather, we merely want to determine 
whether the influence of a single institutional variable, district magnitude, on the number of political 
parties is better described if we take a simple characterization of society's ethnic structure into 
account, with the understanding that there is considerable room for additional refinements in the 
conceptualization and measurement of variables. 
So suppose that we have an index, H, that we take to measure the effective number of ethnic 
groups.9 Our next question is how to enter this variable into the analysis. That is, if the number of
political parties, N, is a function of H as well as of electoral laws, L, then we must contemplate 
alternative functional forms. Regardless of how L and H are conceptualized or operationalized, there 
are two primary choices. The first choice assumes that heterogeneity and election law have 
independent effects modeled by the simple linear relationship 
N = °' + 61 L + 62H. (I) 
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This expression, then, permits district magnitude, heterogeneity, or both variables simultaneously to 
have no effect on party competition. The second possibility is the one that is more consonant with 
the hypothesis that heterogeneity's impact is mediated by electoral structure -- or, equivalently, that 
the operation of electoral structure depends on fixed social preconditions. This possibility is modeled 
by the multiplicative relationship 
N =a+6L*H (2) 
This second expression, then, models Taagepera and Shugart's (1989:65) revision of Duverger's 
hypothesis. However, rather than rely as they do on subjective counts of election issues -- the 
salience of which are almost certainly endogenously determined -- we operationalize Has a variable 
that cannot itself be influenced by electoral law. This is not to say that the salience of issues related 
to ethnicity are not endogenous. Indeed, we should assume that they are related, since the dependence 
of salience on institutional structure is part of the role institutions play in intervening between 
outcomes and social structure. Instead, H measures the potential salience of ethnicity as a basis for 
party formation. 
The analysis we report here, then, ascertains which of these two functional forms best describes 
the data that are the focus of Rae and Lijphart's research and whether incorporating ethnic 
heterogeneity into the analysis contributes anything to our understanding of the consequences of 
electoral laws. Before proceeding, though, we note that Sartori (1986: 67, fn 15) offers the reasonable 
argument that the relationship betvveen proportionality and district magnitude and, by inference, 
between number or parties and magnitude, is curvilinear. That is, although we might predict that 
single-member districts imply 2-party systems, and that, say, I S-member districts might allow four 
or five parties, it is unreasonable to suppose that 120- or ! SO-member districts (Israel and the 
Netherlands) will generate thirty or forty parties, ceteris paribus. Consequently, in addition to 
considering district magnitude, D, by itself, we also consider D112 and the natural log of D, ln(D).10
Notice now that comparing ln(D) to D and n1/2 is especially useful. Since In(!) = 0, letting L =
ln(D) in expression (2) is equivalent to assuming that heterogeneity is of no consequence in single­
member district systems whereas using D and D112 allows heterogeneity to "operate" even in those 
systems. Thus, if, after completing our empirical analysis, we have more confidence in employing 
ln(D) in expression (2) than we have in the alternatives, then we should tentatively accept the 
hypothesis that single-member district systems suppress and even eliminate the potential divisive 
effects of ethnic heterogeneity (c.f., Horowitz 1990). Indeed, this finding, reported in the next 
section, is strong evidence in support of Taagepera and Shugart's previously cited restatement of 
Duverger's argument. 
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3. Analysis - - Lijphart's Regime Approach
Beginning with Lijphart's regime data, Table I presents a series of regressions in which the
dependent variable is the "effective number of parties" based on each party's share of the vote (ENPV)
as calculated by Lijphart. Clearly, none of the results this table reports are statistically spectacular, 
but notice first, from regressions 1-3, that ln(D) performs better than D or D112, although district
magnitude's effect on ENPV is significant regardless of how it is entered. Second, regression 4 reveals 
that ethnic heterogeneity alone is statistically unrelated to ENPV. Third, the comparison of 
regressions I and 6 reveals that adding H to a regression that already contains ln(D) also contributes 
nothing to predictive power -- indeed, due to a loss of degrees of freedom, adjusted R2 declines. 
Thus, if we assume an additive specification like expression (I), the best fit and the most 
parsimonious model using Lijphart's data is simply ENPV = 3.24 + .341n(D).11 That is, adherence
to an additive structure that leads to the conclusion that the effective number of ethnic groups has 
no influence on ENPV and that ln(D) provides whatever explanatory power is available in the two 
independent variables this study considers. 
Table 1: Dependent Variable = ENPV, Lijphart's Data (n = 32) 
reg.# I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Const. 3.68 3.39 3.24 4.10 3.47 3.10 3.35 3.16 
(18.4) (14.2) (12.5) (13.2) (9.7) (7.0) (14.1) (12.9) 
D .01 - - - - - - -
(4.6) 
n1/2 - .14 - - .14 - - -
(4.1) ( 4.1) 
ln(D) - - .34 - - .36 - -
(3.5) (3.3) 
H - - - -.19 -.05 .09 - -
(-.87) (-.25) (.41) 
H*D1/2 - - - - - - 0.13 -
( 4.1) 
Hln(D) - - - - - - - .33 
(4.1) 
adj. R2 .08 .12 .17 .001 .09 .15 .14 .25 
F-stat. 2.6 4.1 6.1 0.1 1.43 2.56 4.88 10.0 
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The last regression in this table, though, shows that this conclusion is erroneous. Specifically, the 
best overall fit is secured assuming, in accordance with expression (2), that heterogeneity and district 
magnitude are interactive. Moreover, the comparison of regressions 7 and 8 shows that, at least when 
ENPV is our dependent variable, the best model is one in which ethnic heterogeneity is assumed to have
no effect on the number of political parties in single-member district systems.12
The comparison of regressions 3 and 8 is also interesting with respect to this conclusion. Notice 
in particular that although the coefficient on In(D) in 3 is significant and nearly identical to that on 
H*ln(D) in 8, multiplying ln(D) by the effective number of ethnic groups increases R2 from 17% to 
25%. That is, although our qualitative conclusion about the influence of district magnitude on the
number of parties does not change with how In( D) is entered into a regression, the "quality" of that
regression improves if we treat district magnitude as a variable that intervenes between ethnic 
heterogeneity and the effective number of parties. 
Countries and Time Period: What we must now do is ascertain the robustness of this finding 
against various things, including: (I) the countries and election periods under consideration; (2) the 
method of counting the number of parties; and (3) alternative measures of district magnitude. First, 
then, accepting the possibility that averages across regimes admit of too many out-of-equilibrium 
elections, consider Table 2, which takes the regimes defined by Lijphart, extends the time period to 
1990, but takes only the last election in each regime as the observation corresponding to that regime. 
In addition, regressions 11 - 14 delete those regimes that contain only one election; and regressions 
13 and 14 add the data from Japan, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, as well as data from the last pre-War 
regime. 
Because we are no longer averaging variables within regimes, statistical relationships appear weaker 
in regression 9-12 than in 6 and 8 -- their counterparts in Table I. Excluding I-election regimes 
improves the fit (regressions 11 and 12), but not to the same extent as does adding excluded countries 
and pre-war elections (regressions 13 and 14). Indeed, the results using the full data set (regressions 
13 and 14), which includes countries that Lijphart excludes owing to their recent arrival upon the 
democratic scene, produces results that are essentially identical to those that regressions 6 and 8 
report. Most importantly, though, we see that our earlier conclusion about the superiority of an 
interactive model as against a linear-additive model is robust to manipulations of the data under 
consideration. That is, comparing regressions 9 and 10, 11 and 12, or 13 and 14 shows that adjusted 
R 2 increases significantly if H and ln(D) are treated as a multiplicative variable rather than as separate 
independent variables. 
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Table 2: Dependent Variable= ENPV, using last election only from a regime 
regression # 9 10 11 12 13 14 
constant 3.33 3.5 3.08 3.4 2.75 3.0 
(4.3) (13.3) (3.7) (12.6) (5.4) (15.3 )  
ln(D) .27 - .31 - .45 -
(2.0) (2.0) (3.5) 
H .27 - .35 - .27 -
(0.5) (0.6) (0.9) 
H*ln(D) - .31 - .35 - .43 
(2.6) (2.4) (4.0) 
adj. R2 .02 .15 .02 .17 .14 .27 
F-statistic 0.3 5.6 0.3 5.7 3.98 18.5 
n 34 34 30 30 52 52 
Counting Parties: Now let us consider other operationalizations of "number of parties." Table 3, 
using the full data set (but once again, excluding I -election regimes) reproduces regressions 13 and 
14 along with regressions in which effective number of parties is calculated using seats (ENPS) and 
in which we count parties that receive at least I% of the vote in two or more successive elections (NV) 
or that secure one or more seats in at least two successive elections (NS). 
The regressions this table reports warrant at least three comments. First, an interactive relation
remains superior to a simple linear additive one regardless of our choice of dependent variable. Thus, 
our conclusion about how heterogeneity ought to be entered into the analysis -- as a variable that 
mediates the influence of district magnitude -- is invariant with how we choose to count parties. 
Second, the best overall fit occurs when we simply count the number of parties. Thus, even if we 
substitute, say, Molinar's (1991) modification of fractionalization (which in general gives a higher 
count of number of effective parties than does Lijphart's measure but which correlates nearly 
perfectly with ENPV otherwise), a simple count of parties is the more accurately predicted dependent 
variable. 
Our final comment concerns the explanatory power gained by adding H to the analysis. Briefly, 
if we delete H altogether from the analysis and simply regress ENPV, ENPS, NV, and NS on ln(D) 
alone, then adjusted R2 dedines from .25, .31, .39, and .36 to .14, .21, .30, and .29, respectively. 
Thus, although average district magnitude "contributes" more to the determination of these alternative 
ways of counting parties than does H, the inclusion of H refines the relationship between ln(D) and 
these counts.13
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Table 3: Alternative counting of parties (last election only, full data set, n = 52)
reg. dep. canst. ln(D) H H*ln(D) adj.R2 F-stat. 
# var. 
13 ENPV 2.7 . 45 . 27 - .14 3.98 
(5.4) (3.5) (0.9) 
14 ENPV 3.0 - - .43 .27 18.49 
(15.3) (4.0) 
15 ENPS 2.42 .47 .12 - .20 6.13 
(5.3) (4.4) (.43) 
16 ENPS 2.48 - - .44 .33 24.63 
(15.5) (5.1) 
17 NV 3.82 1.06 .20 - .29 10.00 
(4.6) (5.1) (0.5) 
18 NV 3.98 - - .94 .40 33.33 
(10.3) (6.5) 
19 NS 3.49 1.23 .42 - .28 9.52 
(3.60) (5.3) (.90) 
20 NS 4.02 - - 1.04 .36 28.13 
(8.60) (6.30) 
District Magnitude: Tables 2 and 3 give us confidence that our conclusion about the superiority 
of an interactive model is robust to manipulations in the countries and time period considered and 
to the operationalization of our dependent variable, we should also consider alternative measures of 
district magnitude. We have noted already that no single measure can capture all of the variation in 
election systems. Nevertheless, let us consider the measure that Taagepera and Shugart (1989) propose 
in order to take more explicit account of the vote thresholds that parties must achieve before securing 
legislative or parliamentary representation owing either to legally specified thresholds or to 
adjustment seats and at-large districts that move a system closer to proportionality. Table 4, then, 
reproduces the regressions reported in Table 3, except that now we replace the calculation of D based 
on a simple average with Taagepera and Shugart's calculations of "effective magnitude," De.14 
The comparison of Tables 3 and 4 shows that, with the exception of the variable NS, Taagepera 
and Shugart's measure does in fact perform better than does D, the simple average.15 Looking at 
the interactive model;and comparing regressions 14; 16;·and· l 8'With Tegressions 22, 24, and 26, R 2's 
increase from .27, .33, and .40 to .36, .46, and .44, respectively for the dependent variables ENPV,
ENPS, and NV. Thus, although we continue to use D in our reanalysis of Rae's approach in the next 
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section, Taagepera and Shugart's efforts at devising a more theoretically satisfying measure of district 
magnitude warrant closer attention, because additional refinements may generate additional payoff. 
Table 4: "Effective" district magnitude (n = 52)
reg. dep. const. ln(D e) H H*ln(De) adj.R2 F-stat. 
# var. 
21 ENPV 2.14 . 53 .47 - .21 6.51 
(3.6) (4.3) (1.3) 
22 ENPV 2.69 - - .49 .36 28.13 
(13.4) (5.2) 
23 ENPS 1.73 .57 .35 - .30 I0.50 
(3.3) (5.7) ( l.l )  
24 ENPS 2.14 - - .51 .46 42.60 
(14.1) (6.8) 
25 NV 2.99 1.09 .50 - .30 I0.50 
(2.90) (4.6) ( 1.0) 
26 NV 3.54 - - .98 .44 39.29 
(8.4) (6.3) 
27 NS 2.97 1.13 .63 - .23 7.32 
(2.4) (3.8) (I.I) 
28 NS 3.73 - - 1.00 .34 25.76 
(6.8) (5.0) 
What we want to emphasize, though, is that our conclusion about the superiority of the interactive 
structure that models district magnitude as an intervening parameter does not depend on how we 
operationalize district magnitude. First, and as before, regressions 22, 24, 26, and 28 each yields a 
better fit than its additive counter-part. And second, aside from the data that Table 4 reports, if we 
regress ENPV, ENPS, NV, and NS on ln(De) alone rather than H*ln(D•), adjusted R2's decline to .18,
.29, .30, and .23 from .34, .43, .43, and .34, respectively. 
4. A Brief Reconsideration of Rae's Approach
Before putting any "seal of approval" on the interactive model, we must consider a number of 
additional issues:-First;-we�honld considerRae's election�-by0election data in order to be certain that 
our conclusions do not depend on definitions of a regime or on regimes that survive for only a few 
elections. Second, noting that countries with single-member district procedures, on average, are more 
heterogeneous that are those with PR systems, we want to be certain that it is not the non-PR 
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countries (Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and France after 
1958) that provide the sole source of explanatory power. 
Turning first to Rae's approach of taking each election outcome as an independent observation, 
Table 5 offers the relevant regressions, and once again offers a comparison of additive and interactive 
models for the alternative dependent variables. Perhaps the most important fact to be gleaned from 
these regressions is that our qualitative conclusion is sustained -- the interactive model performs 
better than a linear additive one. Not only does Table 5 repeat the pattern of better overall fits for 
the interactive model than the simple additive one, regardless of dependent variable, but the use of 
H*ln(D) once again generates an improvement in fit over the use of ln(D) alone -- R2's increase from 
.33, .40, .42, and .44 to .38, .44, .47, and .49.
Table 5: Election-by-Election Data, full sample (n = 453)
reg. dep. canst. ln(D) H H*ln(D) adj.R2 F-stat 
# var. 
29 ENPV 2.7 .55 .10 - .33 110.8 
(20.6) ( 14.1) (1.5) 
30 ENPV 2.8 - - .45 .38 276.4 
(50.5) (15.5) 
31 ENPS 2.37 .57 .04 - .40 150.0 
(20.6) (16.3) (0.7) 
32 ENPS 2.43 - - .47 .44 354.4 
(52.2) (18.1) 
33 NV 3.35 1.20 .21 - .43 160.7 
(14.5) (18.7) (2.00) 
34 NV 3.69 - - .96 .47 399.9 
(35.6) (20.9) 
35 NS 2.54 1.49 .52 - .45 184.1 
(9.80) (19.8) (4.30) 
36 NS 3.4 - - 1.16 .49 433.3 
(29.5) (21.1) 
Aside from the fact that R2's are higher in Table 5 than in Table 3 (which is to be expected owing 
to the greater number of-·ebservations· -- 52·-versus 4§3),. the -0nly· difference of note is that the 
coefficient on heterogeneity is significant when NV and NS are the dependent variables and when 
heterogeneity is treated as a separate independent variable (regressions 41 and 43). However, when 
the interactive model is considered, the similarities between Tables 3 and 5 in the magnitudes of 
15 
coefficients are more remarkable. Looking at the coefficient on H*ln(D), if we use Lijphart's regime 
approach, we get .43, .44, .94, and 1.04 for each of the four dependent variables (regressions 14, 16,
18, and 20) whereas if we use election-by-election data we get .45, .47, .96, and 1.16 (regressions 30,
32, 34, and 36) -- an average difference of less than 7%. Thus, once heterogeneity is appropriately 
factored into the analysis, there is no reason to modify Rae's original conclusions about the influence 
of district magnitude or to argue that district magnitude has a different influence on party systems 
when regimes rather than individual elections are taken as the unit of analysis. 
5. PR Systems Only
The last issue we want to address concerns the extent to which our results are driven by the fact
that the most heterogeneous states on average are those with single-member districts and with the 
fewest number of parties. Specifically, those countries with single-member district regimes -- the 
United States, Canada, Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand, and France -- are, on average, more 
heterogeneous than their proportional-representation counterparts (with an average fractionalization 
score of .40 versus .15) and are associated, on average, with lower values of ENPV (2.98 versus 4.48
for the most recent regime). The particular hypothesis we want to examine, then, is Taagepera and 
Shugart's (1989: 142) assertion that "the decisive question is not whether a particular system is plurality 
or PR, but what its effective magnitude is." 
Tables 6 and 7, then, report the results of a series of regressions that parallel those in Tables 3 and 
5, except that Tables 6 and 7 only use data from PR systems. As expected, the significance of 
heterogeneity alone increases and the gap in goodness of fit as measured by R2 between the liner and 
interactive specifications narrows or disappears altogether, especially when parties are simply counted 
(when the dependent variable is NV or NS). Of course, since the use of expression (2) entails the 
estimation of only two variables rather than three, the F -statistics for the interactive model are 
greater than for the additive model. Aside from this difference, though, it appears that the advantage 
of the interactive model over the additive one disappears in PR systems. That is, the evident 
superiority of the interactive model appears to derive solely from the fact that single-member district 
states not only have fewer parties on average, but also are more heterogeneous than their PR 
counterparts. 
Nevertheless, these data do support the hypothesis that district magnitude is best modeled as an 
intervening variable. Looking first at the intercept terms, if we use the interactive model, then the 
average absolute difference between the value of this term for the complete and partial data sets is 
.29 and .30; but if we use the additive model, this difference is 2.13 and 1.06 for the regime and 
election-by-election data, respectively. Similarly, while the coefficient on ln(D) when used in the 
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additive model varies on average by .19 and .12 in the two data sets (or 25% and 14% of the overall 
average), the coefficient on H*ln(D) varies by .09 and .08 (or 14% and 11% of the overall average). 
Thus, the interactive model offers estimates that are less sensitive to the treatment of the data. 
Table 6: Regime Data, PR systems only (n = 40)
reg. dep. const. ln(D) H H*ln(D) adj.R2 F-stat 
# var. 
37 ENPV 1.14 .23 2.07 - .26 6.5 
(1.4) (I. 7) (2.8) 
38 ENPV 3.10 - - .40 .14 6.2 
(8.5) (2.6) 
39 ENPS 1.20 .22 1.70 - .22 5.2 
(1.6) (1.9) (2.7) 
40 ENPS 2.81 - - .34 .12 5.2 
(8.7) (2.8) 
41 NV 1.38 .88 2.66 - .28 7.2 
(I .4) (4.5) (2.7) 
42 NV 4.09 - - .91 .28 14.8 
(7.6) (5.2) 
43 NS .20 !.33 2.94 - 35 10.0 
(.I 5) (6.8) (2.6) 
44 NS 3.39 - - 1.23 .36 21.4 
(6.6) (7.3) 
There are some things, moreover, that do not change when we delete single-member district 
systems from the sample. First, better fits continue to be secured when parties are simply counted 
rather than computed on the basis of a fractionalization index. Thus, a simple count is more 
predictable than a measure of the effective number of parties, regardless of whether we include 
single-member district systems. Second, the estimated coefficients for H*ln(D) do not change 
dramatically -- to .40, .34, .91, and 1.23 from .43, .44, .94, and 1.04 for the regime data and to .39,
.38, .89, and 1.26 from .45, .47, .96, and 1.16 with election-by-election data. Once again, then, these 
numbers show a considerable stability across alternative treatments of the data. 
Overall, then; we-can-see that-much of the evidence iwfavor-of an interactive-model does in fact 
derive from the character of single-member district states. However, we cannot be altogether 
indifferent between models even if we restrict our attention to PR systems. Considerations like 
parsimony, F-statistics, and the stability of coefficients lead us to prefer estimations in the form of 
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expression (2) over expression (1). And although we can reason that the choice between single- and 
multi-member district systems is a qualitative one that entails other decisions such as the weight that 
ought to be given to achieving proportional representation in some form, analyzing the effects of 
district magnitude can proceed under Taagepera and Shugart's (1989) argument that single-member 
district systems are quantitatively but not qualitatively different form their multi-member district 
counterparts. 
Table 7: Election-by-Election Data, PR systems only (n = 318) 
reg. dep. const. ln(D) H H*ln(D) adj.R2 F-stat 
# var. 
45 ENPV 2.11 .41 .90 - .21 41.8 
(7.8) (8.4) (3.0) 
46 ENPV 3.06 - - .39 .21 84.0 
(28.7) (9.4) 
47 ENPS 1.90 .43 .75 - .21 41.8 
(7.6) (9.2) (3.6) 
48 ENPS 2.73 - - .38 .21 84.0 
(26.1) (9.8) 
49 NV 2.13 I.OJ 1.62 - .30 67.5 
(4.7) (12.6) (4.4) 
50 NV 3.95 - - .89 .30 135.4 
(20.1) (13.3) 
51 NS .58 1.48 2.13 - .41 109.7 
(1.2) (17.3) (4.9) 
52 NS 3.05 - - 1.26 .40 210.7 
(16.2) (17.6) 
6. Conclusion
There are many things this essay does not consider, such as the influence of seat allocation 
formulas and ballot structure (Rae 1971 and Lijphart 1990), vote thresholds (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989), the influence of presidential versus parliamentary systems (Jones 1992a,b and Shugart and 
Carey 1992), and the nature of federal institutions and the territoriality of ethnicity (Horowitz 1991, 
Lijphart 1977, 1984); And, as we note earlier,-we also fail to consider district-magnitude itself as an 
endogenously determined parameter chosen to achieve certain ends in the context of a particular 
environment (Shamir 1985). To the extent, then, that H influences D, our approach probably 
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overstates district magnitude's mediating influence while it understates the role of ethnic 
heterogeneity. 
Unfortunately, sorting out the interdependencies among social structure, electoral laws, and 
outcomes requires a firmer theoretical footing than is available. An empirical investigation 
uninformed by rigorously derived theoretical relationships is, with that data at hand, unlikely to yield 
definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, with this caveat in mind, we conclude by portraying the 
interactive model in graphical terms. Figure 1 graphs the contours of NV against D and H for the 
expression NV = 3.98 + .94* H*ln(D) -- regression number 18. Notice in particular that if the 
effective number of ethnic groups is large (if fractionalization is great), the system becomes especially 
sensitive to district magnitude. But if fractionalization is low, then only especially large average 
district magnitudes result in any "wholesale" increase in formally organized parties. Finally, if district 
magnitude equals one, then the party system is relatively "impervious" to ethnic and linguistic 
heterogeneity -- keeping in mind, of course, that this conclusion rests on data from one source -­
stable, economically prosperous Western democracies. 
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Appendix 1: Regime Data 
Country Year NV F ENPV D 
Australia 1940 3 0.69 3.56 1.00 
1987 4 0.69 2.90 1.00 
Austria 1930 3 0.88 3.15 5.70 
1970 3 0.88 2.29 5.70 
1983 3 0.88 2.40 20.30 
Belgium 1939 6 0.46 4.17 7.00 
1987 1 1  0.46 8.12 7.10 
Canada 1940 4 0.25 2.69 1.00 
1988 3 0.25 3.04 1.00 
Denmark 1939 8 0.97 3.85 10.00 
1953 6 0.97 3.92 10.00 
1968 7 0.97 4.56 7.30 
1988 10 0.97 5.83 7.30 
Finland 1939 7 0.84 4.05 14.00 
1987 '8 0.84 6.15 14.00 
France 1946 6 0.75 4.65 5.00 
1956 8 0.75 6.08 5.00 
1981 7 0.75 4.14 1 00 
1988 7 0.75 4.38 1.00 
Germany 1924 10 0.98 6.51 14.10 
1933 7 0.98 3.83 17.00 
1987 5 0.98 3.56 1.99 
Greece 1989 3 0.91 2.73 5.30 
Iceland 1937 5 0.99 3.58 1.75 
1959 5 0.99 3.40 1.85 
1983 5 0.99 4.26 6 .60 
Ireland 1938 3 0.96 2.55 3.50 
1989 6 0.96 3.36 4.00 
Israel 1969 10 0.81 3.63 120.00 
1988 9 0.81 5.02 120.00 
Italy 1987 9 0.96 4.61 20.00 
Japan 1986 6 0.98 3.35 4.00 
Luxemburg 1937 4 0.94 3.35 6.50 
1989 5 0.94 4.65 15.00 
Netherlands 1937 8 0.91 5.79 100.00 
1986 7 0.91 3.77 150.00 
New Zealand 1938 2 0.63 2.10 1.00 
1987 2 0.63 2.34 1.00 
Norway 1936 8 0.96 3.75 7.90 
1949 6 0.96 3.76 7.90 
1985 7 0.96 3.63 8.20 
Portugal 1987 5 0.97 2.98 12.00 
Spain 1986 6 0.56 3.59 6.70 
Sweden 1940 5 0.93 2.84 8.30 
1968 7 0.93 3.18 9.00 
1988 6 0.93 3.91 12.00 
Switzerland 1939 10 0.50 6.00 7.80 
1987 10 0.50 6.80 8.00 
U.K. 1935 5 0.68 2.62 1.00 
1987 6 0.68 3.33 1.00 
U.S.A. 1940 2 0.50 2.09 1.00 
1988 2 0.50 2.03 1.00 
2 0  
Appendix 2: Election-by-Election Data 












































































































































































































































































































































3 1949 3.26 
3 1950 2.76 
3 1954 3.08 
3 1958 2.79 
3 1961 3.08 
3 1965 3.98 
3 1968 4.21 
3 1971 4.60 
3 1974 6.11 
3 1977 5.70 
3 1978 7.53 
3 1981 8.99 
3 1985 8.13 
3 1987 8.12 
Canada: 
4 1921 3.21 
4 1925 2.60 
4 1926 2.38 
4 1930 2.25 
4 1935 3.27 
4 1940 2.69 
4 1945 3.65 
4 1949 2.83 
4 1953 2.85 
4 1957 2.98 
4 1958 2.44 
4 1962 3.23 
4 1963 3.20 
4 1965 3.31 
4 1968 2.97 
4 1972 3.25 
4 1974 2.96 
4 1979 3.09 
4 1980 2.93 
4 1984 2.75 
4 1988 3.04 
Denmark: 
5 1920 3.75 
5 1924 3.75 
5 1926 3.65 
5 1929 3.40 
5 1932 3.47 
5 1935 3.49 
5 1939 3.85 
5 1943 3.50 
5 1945 4.56 
5 1947 3.80 
5 1950 4.01 
5 1953 3.92 
5 1953 3.80 
5 1957 3.90 
5 1960 3.81 
5 1964 3.75 
5 1966 4.22 
5 1968 4.56 
5 1971 4.52 
5 1973 7.11 
5 1975 5.60 
5 1977 5.23 
5 1979 4.99 
5 1981 5.75 
5 1984 5.25 
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5 1988 5.83 
Finland: 
6 1919 4.18 
6 1922 5.46 
6 1924 5.14 
6 1927 5.08 
6 1929 5.02 
6 1930 4.18 
6 1933 4.23 
6 1936 4.28 
6 1939 4.05 
6 1945 5.09 
6 1948 4.90 
6 1951 4.96 
6 1954 4.98 
6 1958 5.19 
6 1962 5.86 
6 1966 5.22 
6 1970 6.17 
6 1972 5.95 
6 1975 5.89 
6 1979 5.74 
6 1983 5.45 










































































































































































































































































9 1974 2.74 1.73 
9 1977 3.74 2.32 
9 1981 2.68 2.10 
9 1985 2.59 2.14 
9 1989 2.73 2.40 
Iceland: 
10 1916 4.56 4.78 
10 1919 3.05 2.96 
10 1922 4.28 3.01 
10 1923 2.59 2.12 
10 1926 3.58 3.01 
10 1927 3.23 2.73 
10 1930 2.68 1.80 
10 1931 2.88 2.19 
10 1933 3.03 2.58 
10 1934 3.55 3.27 
10 1937 3.58 3.30 
10 1942 3.54 3.16 
10 1942 3.65 3.49 
10 1946 3.58 3.60 
10 1949 3.56 3.47 
10 1953 4.16 3.44 
10 1956 3.62 3.48 
10 1959 3.66 3.44 
10 1959 3.40 3.20 
10 1963 3.37 3.33 
10 1967 3.77 3.55 
10 1971 4.10 3.85 
10 1974 3.47 3.38 
10 1978 4.20 3.85 
10 1979 3.89 3. 79 
10 1983 4.26 4.07 
10 1987 5.77 5.35 
Ireland: 
11 1922 3.84 3.21 
11 1923 3.77 3.53 
11 1927 5.15 4.59 
11 1927 3.42 3.14 
11 1932 2.94 2.69 
11 1933 2.82 2.75 
11 1937 2.90 2.61 
11 1938 2.55 2.36 
11 1943 3.67 3.14 
11 1944 3.24 2.74 
1 1  1948 3.99 3.54 
11 1951 3.27 3.16 
11 1954 3.21 3.03 
11 1957 3.12 2.73 
11 1961 3.20 2.80 
11 1965 2.72 2.63 
11 1969 2.82 2.45 
11 1973 2.80 2.58 
11 1977 2.73 2.37 
11 1981 2.85 2.61 
11 1982 2.68 2.55 
11 1982 2.71 2.55 
11 1987 3.46 2.89 


































































































































































































































1955 6.31 6.00 
1959 5.15 4.90 
1961 5.49 5.36 
1965 4.91 4.71 
1969 3.63 3.56 
1973 3.83 3.36 
1977 5.04 4.37 
1981 3.59 3.12 
1984 4.28 3.86 
1988 5.02 4.40 
1946 4.67 4.39 
1948 2.94 2.88 
1953 4.17 3.54 
1958 3.87 3.45 
1963 4.15 3.74 
1968 3.95 3.53 
1972 4.07 3.55 
1976 3.50 3.16 
1979 3.90 3.47 
1983 4.51 4.11 
1987 4.61 4.08 
1946 4.32 4.19 
1947 4.49 3.94 
1949 3.88 2.75 
1952 3.41 3.04 
1953 4.36 3.85 
1955 3.99 3.68 
1958 2.23 1.98 
1960 2.40 2.00 
1963 2.55 2.15 
1967 3.03 2.41 
1969 3.36 2.49 
1972 3.40 2.67 
1976 4.01 3.18 
1979 3.76 3.30 
1980 3.44 2.71 
1983 3.63 3.23 
1986 3.35 2.57 
15 1919 3.01 
4.17 
2.69 
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17 1949 2.03 1.96 
17 1951 2.00 1.88 
17 1954 2.48 1 .97 
17 1957 2.31 2.00 
17 1960 2.37 1.96 
17 1963 2.39 1.97 
17 1966 2.61 2.02 
17 1969 2.45 1.99 
17 1972 2.43 1.87 
17 1975 2.55 1.87 
17 1978 2.87 2.02 
17 1981 2.89 2.08 
17 1984 2.99 1.98 
17 1987 2.34 1.94 
Norway: 
18 1921 4.49 4.94 
18 1924 4.90 5.24 
18 1927 4.05 3.77 
18 1930 4.15 4.01 
18 1933 3.98 3.32 
18 1936 3.75 3.19 
18 1945 4.12 3.17 
18 1949 3.76 2.67 
18 1953 3.53 3.09 
18 1957 3.44 2.99 
18 196! 3.58 3.22 
18 1965 3.90 3.51 
18 1969 3.61 3.18 
18 1973 5.17 4.14 
18 1977 3.85 2.97 
18 1981 3.90 3.20 















































































































































































































2 J  
2 J  
2 J  
2 J  
2 J  
2 J  
2 J  
2 J  
2 J  
2 J  
2 J  
2 J  
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2 J  
2 J  
Switzerland: 
J979 3.0J 4.16 
J980 2.89 4.23 
1983 3.73 3.41 
1985 4.77 4.26 
1987 2.98 2.37 
J977 4.29 2.92 
J979 4.25 2.8J 
J982 3.J8 2.33 
J986 3.59 3.02 
19J7 4.JO 3.54 
J920 4.40 4.00 
192J 4.04 3.60 
J924 3.72 3.23 
J928 3.88 3.53 
J932 3.8J 3.32 
Jll36 3.54 3.J9
J940 2.84 2.5J 
1944 3.48 3.J3
J948 3.35 3.06 
1952 3.28 3.09 
1956 3.38 3.J8
1958 3.3J 3.J6
1960 3.25 3.J2 
1964 3.42 3.25 
J968 3.18 2.88 
1970 3.48 3.3J 
1973 3.50 3.35 
1976 3.58 3.44 
J979 3.63 3.49 
J982 3.39 3.J3
J985 3.52 3.39 
J988 3.9J 3.67 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1 :  Number or Parties
NV = 3 . 96 + � 94H* l n < D )  
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Endnotes 
I .  We refer here to the spatial modeling literature (see, for example, Enelow and Hinich 1984) 
and to the literature on the equilibrium number of parties, beginning with Duverger (1954) 
and proceeding through Cox (1984), Palfrey (1989) and Fedderson et al (1990). 
2. However, for an analysis that takes us part way towards a characterization of other equilibria
by way of establishing the existence of other equilibria see Greenberg and Weber (1985).
3. A one-percent cutoff is employed so as to reduce the extent to which our analysis depends
on potential variations in the "other" category of vote tabulations. Note that this rule
sometimes results in the number of parties with seats in parliaent exceeding the number of
parties receiving more than one percent of the vote.
4. Like Lijphart, the central source of our data is Maskie and Rose (l 991 ). We would also like
to thank Lijphart for making the data and coding employed in his study available to us.
5. We should comment at this point on one variable that we do not consider
disproportionality. Ignoring normative issues, any concern with disproportionality (as
measured by the average of absolute discrepancies between each party's share of the vote and
share of legislative seats) derives from the fact that an electoral system's tendency to constrain
the number of political parties derives, presumably, from the extent to which its mechanics
can produce, ceteris paribus, "wasted votes." Employing measures of disproportionality based
on actual election returns as an independent variable, however, ignores the fact that the
influence of disproportionality is already reflected in those returns to the extent that they
influence voting patterns. Thus, no clean logical relationship can be established between such
measures and this study's dependent variable -- number of parties. Instead, we focus on the
presumed primary source of disproportionality and the variable that is most commonly subject
to choice and manipulation -- district magnitude.
6. See also Lijphart (1977) -- especially the discussion and citations in note 10, page 59 -- and
Rae and Taylor (1970) for additional discussion rationalizing the use of fractionalization
indices in this context.
7. The particular difficulty with language is that many people are multi-lingual and, thus, their
classification in the calculation of a fractionalization index can be arbitrary; similarly,
calculating an index of religious fractionalization encounters the problem of how to classify
those who indicate either no religious affiliation or classify themselves as agnostic or atheist.
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8. Territoriality also bears on the interactive influence of other institutional features that we do 
not consider, such as federal structure. A comparison of the United States, Switzerland and
Belgium, for example, should result in different conclusions about the role of heterogeneity.
All three states are heterogeneous, but territoriality is relevant only in Switzerland and
Belgium. Thus, although the degree of federal decentralization will influence the nature of
electoral competition and party structures in Belgium and Switzerland, including the ultimate
salience of ethnic or linguistic matters, its influence should be less in the United States.
9. Ethnicity data are taken from Atlas Naradov Mira, Moscow, 1960. Religious and linguistic
heterogeneity is computed using data from a more recent source -- Encyclopedia Britannica,
1 980. Under the reasonable assumption that none of these variables changes greatly for the
period under consideration, a single index for ethnicity, for language, and for religion is
computed for each country. To our knowledge, this is in fact, they only way to ensure
consistent data across time periods.
10. Ln(D) captures the idea that the vote quota sufficient to secure a seat in parliament, l /(D+l),
decreases as D increases, but at a decreasing rate. Nevertheless, it might seem that a more
direct measure would be l /( J+D) itself. In fact, ln(D) provides a considerably and consistently
better fit to the data than does .5-1/(D+1 ). The reasons for this, we can speculate, is that
l /(D+l )  approximately equates the influence of D in, say, Austria (J /21 = .047) with its
influence in Israel ( J/121 = .008) when compared to the quota, .5, in a single-member district
system. That is, l/(J +D) assumes implicitly that there are, in effect, only three types of
systems -- "small" (D = !), "medium" (D in the rage of, say, 2 to 10), and "large" (D > 10).
Also, the change in ln(D) as D increases better matches our sense of the "rate at which a
system achieves proportionality" -- .5-1/(D+ I) assumes that systems achieve proportionality
quickly whereas ln(D) models a more gradual increase.
J I. Taagepera and Shugart (1989:144) report the relationship ENPV' = 1.25(2 + log(D.)], which,
since o• varies in the range [1,75], allows us to rewrite this expression as ENPV' = 1.25[2 +
.43ln(D.)]. Rewriting our estimated expression in the same form yields ENPV = 1.25[2.6 +
.27ln(D)]. Thus, we estimate a higher intercept than does Taagepera and Shugart, but a lower
coefficient for district magnitude. This difference, though, can be explained largely by
differences in the respective data sets. Specifically, Taagepera and Shugart include pre-World
War I data from Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Belgium, as well as
data from U.S. Senate races as an observation separate from U.S. House races, all of which
have lower than average party counts and district magnitudes.
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12. Of course, performing a non-nested regression by entering ln(D), H, and H*ln(D)
simultaneously generates the usual problem of multicolinearity. Nevertheless, if we do so,
there is no increase in adjusted R2, the F-statistic declines precipitously as expected, the
coefficients on ln(D) and H are both statistically insignificant, and the coefficient for H*ln(D)
remains significant but less so that in the original single-variable regression.
13. Although we focus on ethnicity, because we have more confidence in its measurement and
incorporation into a fractionalization index. Nevertheless, using ENPV and NV as dependent
variables, the following regressions parallel regression sets { 1 3, I 4) and { I  7, I 8) except that
language and religious fractionalization are used to calculate heterogeneity -- H1 and H,
respectively. First, with respect to linguistic fractionalization,
ENPV = 2.00 + .39ln(D) + 0.9H1; R2 = .21 
(3.0) (3.3) ( l .  7) 
ENPV 3.23 + .29H1*ln(D); R2 = . 1 9  
(15.3) (3.0) 
NV 2.71 + l .Oln(D) + I.I 1H1; R2 = .32 
(2.6) (5.7) ( I  .4) 
NV 4.36 + .68H1*ln(D); R2 = .34 
(11.9) (5.9) 
These regressions show that linguistic heterogeneity generates results that are nearly 
equivalent to those generated by ethnic heterogeneity with both R2 and the magnitude of 
coefficients being statistically similar. However, if we ignore the issue of whether the 
differences are statistically significant, ethnicity does provide the better fit. Next, with 
respect to religious heterogeneity, 
ENPV = 3.39 + .381n(D) - .08H,; 
(8.8) (3.2) (-0.7) 
ENPV 3.49 + .15H:ln(D); 
(16.4) (2.3) 
NV 4.90 + .93ln(D) - 0.30H,; 
(7.9) (5.4) (-1.8) 
NV = 5.01 + .33H,*ln(D); 
(12.5) (2.7) 
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R2 = . 1 3  
R2 = .12 
R2 = .31 
R2 = .19 
Thus, religion produces fits that are uniformly inferior to those of language and ethnicity - ­
indeed, in a simple linear model (not reported here), the coefficient on religion has the wrong 
sign (but is also not significant). This finding, though, is not surprising, if religion is subject 
to the inherent ambiguity of how people choose to report weak or non-existent affiliations. 
Thus, we should not suppose that this negative result would hold in societies with more 
sharply drawn religious affiliations or with affiliations that correlate with ethnicity (e.g., in 
the successor states of the Soviet Union, especially Ukraine). 
1 4 .  See, in particular, Tables 12.1 and 12.2 of Taagepera and Shugart's text. 
15. D0 provides a better fit than does D since the substitution of D0 for D does appear to adjust
the calculation of magnitude in the right direction for the right countries. For example, West
Germany has "too many" parties for an average district magnitude of 2 and Denmark has too
many for D = 5.
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